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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
ALAN B. THOMAS, JR. (directly and 
derivatively in his capacity as a 
shareholder of LecStar Corporation) 
and HEATHER McFARLAND (directly 
and derivatively in her capacity as a 
shareholder of LecStar Corporation), 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JOHN C. CANOUSE, 
STEPHEN M. HICKS, SOUTH RIDGE 
W. DALE SMITH, CACHE CAPITAL 
(USA), L.P., ATLANTIS CAPITAL 
FUND, LTD., and McCORMACK 
AVENUE, LTD., 
Defendants, 
v. 
LECSTAR CORPORATION, 
as a Nominal Defendant. 
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CIVIL ACTION 
NO. 2004-CV-88793 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ADD 
S. LAIRD ELLIS, '" AND FRANCOISE ELLIS AS PLAINTIFFS 
On November 16, 2009, Counsel appeared before the Court to present 
oral argument on Plaintiffs' Motion to Add S. Laird Ellis, III and Francoise Ellis as 
Plaintiffs. After hearing the arguments made by counsel, and reviewing the briefs 
submitted on the motions and the record in the case, the Court finds as follows. 
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Background 
This motion to add plaintiffs arises out of a pending settlement through 
which Plaintiffs, Alan B. Thomas, Jr. and Heather McFarland would settle their 
direct claims with Defendants. The settlement calls for Plaintiffs Thomas and 
McFarland to transfer their Lecstar Corporation ("Lecstar" or "the Corporation") 
shares to certain Defendants. Any such settlement would mean that these 
Plaintiffs would no longer be shareholders of Lecstar and, therefore, would lose 
standing to pursue derivative claims on behalf of the Corporation. To avoid harm 
to Lecstar and its other shareholders, before approving any such settlement, the 
Court permitted Plaintiffs Thomas and McFarland to file a motion to add plaintiffs, 
and on September 11, 2009, they filed a motion pursuant to D.C.G.A. 9-11-21 to 
add two new Plaintiffs, S. Laird Ellis, III and Francoise Ellis (the "Ellises"). 
In opposition to Plaintiffs' motion to add the Ellises, the South ridge 
Defendants argue that these potential plaintiffs should not be added because 
they do not have standing to sue. These Defendants contend that the Ellises 
lack standing because (1) they cannot fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the Corporation, (2) they "failed to comply with the statutory demand 
requirements for bringing derivative claims," and (3) their claims are barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations. 
Standard 
Under Georgia law, "[P]arties may be dropped or added by order of the 
court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and 
on such terms as are just." D.C.G.A. § 9-11-21. "The determination of whether a 
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party should be added to a lawsuit lies within the discretion of the trial court, and 
that determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse." 
Ellison v. Hill, 288 Ga. App. 415, 418 (2007). 
Substantive Law 
The Parties do not dispute that Texas substantive law controls this case. 
Texas law provides that "[A] shareholder may not commence or maintain a 
derivative proceeding unless the shareholder: (1) was a shareholder of the 
corporation at the time of the act or omission complained of or became a 
shareholder by operation of law from a person that was a shareholder at that 
time; and (2) fairly and adequately represents the interests of the corporation in 
enforcing the right of the corporation." V.A.T.S. Bus. Corp. Act, Art. 5.14 (b). 
Fair and Adequate Representation of Corporate Interests 
As the Court noted in its January 16, 2009,Order on Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, a trial court must decide whether a shareholder 
adequately represents the interests of the corporation, and that decision will not 
be disturbed absent abuse of discretion. Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 
Inc., 651 F.2d 1030, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981). A plaintiff in a shareholder derivative 
action must not have ulterior motives and must not be pursuing an external 
personal agenda. Smith v. Ayres, 977 F.2d 946,949 (5th Cir. 1992). The 
South ridge Defendants argue that the Ellises' earlier attempt to settle the 
derivative suit demonstrates a "conflict of interest" rendering them unable to 
adequately represent the interests of the Corporation. However, the Court finds 
that the Ellises have attempted to settle the derivative claims, not merely for 
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themselves, but for all of the remaining Lecstar shareholders who are not 
affiliated with the Defendants. The Court finds that this does not evidence a 
conflict of interest. In addition, the Court finds that there is no evidence that the 
Ellises "interests are antagonistic to those [they are] seeking to represent." 
Williams v. Service Corp. International, 218 Ga.App. 10, 11,459 S.E.2d 621,622 
(Ga. App. 1995). Nor is there any evidence that their attempt to settle did not 
have the best interest of the other shareholders in mind. 
The South ridge Defendants point to Hornreich v. Plant Industries, Inc., 
535 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1976), as authority for the proposition that attempts to 
settle a derivative claim render a shareholder inadequate to represent their 
corporation. In that case, the potential plaintiff had been fired as a result of a 
dispute with the very same entity that he sought to represent and had also used 
the threat of suit as leverage to settle his other claims. kL at 551. Thus, 
Hornreich is distinguishable from the facts in this case. 
The South ridge Defendants cite several factors that courts consider when 
determining whether a proposed derivative plaintiff can adequately and fairly 
represent a corporation. Citing Rothenberg v. Security Mgmt. Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 
958,961 (11th Cir. 1982), the factors the South ridge Defendants raise are: (1) 
indications that the plaintiff is not the true party in interest, (2) the degree of 
control exercised by the attorneys over the litigation, (3) the plaintiff's 
unfamiliarity with the litigation and unwillingness to learn about the suit, (4) the 
lack of any personal commitment to the action on the part of the representative 
plaintiff, and (5) the degree of support received by the plaintiff from other 
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shareholders. The South ridge Defendants give great weight to the second factor 
and argue that the "degree of control exercise by the [Plaintiffs'] attorneys over 
the litigation is total." The Court finds that Plaintiffs' counsel's involvement in and 
control over this case is no greater than that of other attorneys in similar cases. 
The Court also finds that three of the factors cited by the South ridge Defendants 
have been satisfied by Plaintiffs. Specifically, the Court finds that (1) there is no 
evidence that the Ellises are not the true parties in interest as they are Lecstar 
shareholders and were shareholders at the time the alleged wrongs in this case 
occurred, (2) the Ellises are generally familiar with this litigation and have 
demonstrated a willingness to learn more about the suit as evidenced by their 
preparation for and attendance at the hearing on this motion, and (3) the Ellises 
have shown personal commitment to this suit. 
Demand Requirement 
The South ridge Defendants argue that "the Ellises lack standing to bring a 
derivative claim because they failed to comply with the statutory demand 
requirement for bringing derivative claims." Under the Texas Business 
Corporations Act a derivative proceeding cannot be commenced unless a 
shareholder files a written demand, and waits ninety days for the corporation to 
take suitable action or until the shareholder is notified that the demand has been 
rejected by the corporation, unless the corporation is suffering irreparable injury 
or such injury would result from waiting ninety days. V.AT.S. Bus. Corp. Act. 
5.14 (c). As this Court ruled in its January 16, 2009 Order, previous demands 
will "bind similarly situated shareholders making identical claims." Pace v. 
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Jordan, 999 S.W.2d 615,621 (Tex. App. 1999). "Judicial economy demands 
that identical claims, which in actuality belong to the corporation, be 
simultaneously disposed of by one demand." Id. at 621. Here, the Ellises are in 
the same position as Plaintiffs Thomas and McFarland. They are all 
shareholders of Lecstar and are pursuing the same derivative claim on behalf of 
the Corporation. 
Statute of Limitations 
The South ridge Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs should not be allowed 
to add the Ellises as Plaintiffs because of a narrow exception under Georgia law 
that would require the Court to apply the Texas statute of limitations and render 
the Ellises' claim time barred. The South ridge Defendants note that while the 
issue of relation back is generally a procedural issue governed by Georgia law, 
an exception to this rule exists when "the limitation is established as a condition 
precedent to the action by the statute which creates the cause of action." Gray v. 
Armstrong, 222 Ga.App. 392,474 S.E.2d 280 (1996); See also Griffen v. Hunt 
Refining Co., 292 Ga. App. 451 (2008). When the exception applies, the statute 
of limitations of the state where the tort was committed governs so that here, 
Texas law would control the procedural issue of relation back. The Southridge 
Defendants argue that the demand requirement is such a "condition precedent." 
While the demand requirement may be a condition precedent to a shareholder 
derivative suit, it is not a [statute of] limitation. As it did in its January 16, 2009 
Order, the Court finds that Georgia law prevails on the issue of relation back. 
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Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c), relation back is allowed whenever 
there is an identity of interests between the old and new parties so that it will not 
create prejudice to the opposing party. If leave is sought to change or add 
plaintiffs after the expiration of the statute of limitation, provided "the claim ... 
asserted in the amended [complaint] arises out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original [complaint], the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original [complaint]." Morris v. 
Chewning, 201 Ga. App. 658, 659, (1991) (citing OCGA§ 9-11-15(c)). The 
Court finds that the Ellises share a unity of interest with Plaintiffs Thomas and 
McFarland such that Defendants are not prejudiced and that the Ellises would be 
asserting the same claims as originally asserted. 
Conclusion 
The Court finds that the Ellises were shareholders of Lecstar at the time 
the acts complained of in the Complaint were committed and that the Ellises can 
fairly and adequately represent the interests of Lecstar in a derivative suit. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion to Add S. Laird Ellis, III and Francois Ellis as 
Plaintiffs is GRANTED. 
SO ORDERED this \ 7 day of December, 2009. 
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta JUdicial Circuit 
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